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NOTES
BANKRUPTCY - Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements Before and After the 1984 Code Amendments.
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
I. THE STATUTORY ORIGINS OF CONFLICT
The struggle between the often competing interests of cor-
porate management and organized labor has given rise to a
plethora of legislation designed to promote the peaceful and
orderly resolution of conflict. One such piece of legislation,
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), was designed by
Congress, in part, to establish and protect a uniform system
for "collective bargaining."' 2  Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA
states, "[it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain collectively with the [employees'] representa-
tives," and elaboration upon the specific conduct constituting
unfair labor practices is provided in section 8(d).3 The pur-
pose of these sections, and the NLRA in general, is to pro-
mote "the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest . ...
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) defined "collective bargaining" as "[t]he performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment .... "
3. Id. § 158(a)(5). 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract
shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party...
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party...
(2) offers to meet and confer...
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. . . and,
(4) continues in full force and effect . . . all the terms and conditions of the
existing contract ....
4. Id. § 151. See also NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 282-83
(1972) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937), which
stated, "[t]he theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited
representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about
the adjustments and agreements which the Act itself does not attempt to compel.");
H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970) ("The basic theme of the Act
was that through collective bargaining the passions, arguments, and struggles of prior
years would be channeled into constructive, open discussions leading, it was hoped, to
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A similar substantive body of law has evolved in order to
protect the interests of corporate debtors. Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code5 permits a debtor to avoid liquidation by
reorganizing under the supervision of the court. Upon filing a
petition in bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11, the debtor is
granted a unique set of powers designed to provide it with the
flexibility necessary to affect a successful reorganization of the
business. 6 Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code confers the
power to reject executory contracts7 upon the debtor in pos-
session.8 By permitting the debtor in possession to reject its
executory contracts, Congress intended to facilitate reorgani-
zation and thus promote economic efficiency. "The premise
of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for
production in the industry for which they were designed are
much more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap." 9
The nexus between the NLRA and the Bankruptcy Code
lies in the fact that a collective bargaining agreement is a type
mutual agreement."); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); NLRB
v. North Arkansas Elec. Corp., Inc., 446 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1971).
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1982).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5963, 6179-80; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5902.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in section 765 and
766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c) and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to
the court's approval, may reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor." In its attempt to define "executory contracts" the Senate concluded, "[t]hough
there is no precise definition of what contracts are executory, it generally includes con-
tracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides." S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5844. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.02 n.3 (1984).
8. Although 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982) refers specifically to a trustee's right to re-
ject executory contracts, section 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code extends this right to
the debtor in possession. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) provides:
Subject to any limitations on a trustee under this chapter, and to such limitations
or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all the
rights, other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title, and
powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties. . . of a trustee serving in
a case under this chapter.
In creating and interpreting section 1107, Congress emphasized, "[t]his section places a
debtor in possession in the shoes of a trustee in every way." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 404 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787,
5902.
9. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6179.
[Vol. 68:351
EXECUTOR Y CONTRA CTS
of executory contract, 10 and thus, while it is protected by the
NLRA, it is also subject to rejection under the Bankruptcy
Code.
One of the most notable judicial responses to this conflict
was rendered by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco."I The Bildisco decision was followed, less
than five months later, by the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAJA),12 in part, a congres-
sional effort to clarify the relationship between the debtor in
possession and its unionized employees.
The purpose of this Note is to undertake a discussion of
both the judicial and congressional responses to the statutory
conflict and to suggest how future interpretation of the
Bildisco decision may be affected by the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE BILDISCO DECISION
Bildisco and Bildisco, a New Jersey general partnership
engaged in the sale and distribution of building materials, filed
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy for reorganization on April
14, 1980, pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
After that date, Bildisco operated its business as a debtor in
possession. 13
In December 1980 Bildisco filed a motion with the bank-
ruptcy court seeking an order authorizing the company to re-
ject its collective bargaining agreement with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America. 14 A hearing was held upon Bildisco's re-
10. See Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 479 (1974).
11. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
12. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 333.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982). See supra note 8.
14. The collective bargaining agreement signed by Bildisco and Local 408 of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of
America was effective from May 1, 1979 through April 30, 1982, and expressly pro-
vided that its terms were binding upon both parties in the event of bankruptcy. See
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (1984). The filing of this motion
was pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). See also note 7.
1985]
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quest. 5 The bankruptcy court subsequently granted Bildisco
permission to reject the collective bargaining agreement on
January 15, 1981. The district court upheld the order, and the
union appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
Between January and April 14, 1980, Bildisco failed to
meet certain obligations, in contravention of its collective bar-
gaining agreement.1 6 The union filed a claim with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB). It charged that
Bildisco had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act17 by unilaterally changing the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement and thus not bargaining in
good faith. 8 After notification of the bankruptcy court's or-
der, the NLRB in turn issued an order on April 23, 1981.
Bildisco was directed not only to abide by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, but also to make all delin-
quent contributions and payments plus the accumulated inter-
est and to post the appropriate notices.
The Third Circuit consolidated the NLRB's motion for
enforcement of its order and the union's appeal from the dis-
trict court's ruling. The Third Circuit concluded that section
365(a) authorized the bankruptcy court to permit the rejection
15. At the hearing, Sal Valente, a general partner of Bildisco, testified that his firm
could realize a savings of approximately $100,000 in wages and fringe benefits in 1981 if
it was granted permission to reject its collective bargaining agreement. See Joint Ap-
pendix in Brief for Petitioner Local Union Number 408, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters at 59-61, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
16. Bildisco ceased making pension and welfare payments to its union employees'
trust funds in January 1980. Moreover, Bildisco failed to forward the union dues which
were withheld from employee paychecks and subsequently failed to provide pay in-
creases and vacation pay as required under the agreement. See Brief for Petitioner Lo-
cal Union Number 408, International Brotherhood of Teamsters at 2-3, NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (5) (1982).
18. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title."
Id. § 158(a)(1). 29 U.S.C. § 157 provides in pertinent part: -[e]mployees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing ....... For a discussion of the
legislative policy underlying section 158(a)(1), see NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
133 F.2d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 1943) (quoting International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 72, 80 (1940)).
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of collective bargaining agreements. 9 However, because of
the unique nature of the collective bargaining agreement,2 ° the
Third Circuit fashioned a two-pronged test under which rejec-
tion of the agreement could be granted only when the bank-
ruptcy court determines that its continuation would be
burdensome to the estate of the debtor in possession and only
after the court submits the case to a "thorough scrutiny, and a
careful balancing of the equities on both sides. 2 1
In addition, the Third Circuit refused to enforce the
NLRB's order for summary judgment against Bildisco. It re-
jected the NLRB's premise that the debtor in possession was
in fact an alter ego of the original debtor and thus a party to
the collective bargaining agreement. Instead, it relied upon
the two ground-breaking decisions of NLRB v. Burns Interna-
tional Security Services, Inc. 22 and Local Union No. 455 v. Ke-
19. See In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1982), affid sub nom. NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984). In reaching this conclusion, the Third
Circuit relied heavily upon the fact that "Congress did provide detailed provisions for
acceptance of executory contracts such as shopping centers, leases, § 365(b)(3), and
transactions in commodities futures contracts, §§ 765, 766." Id. At the same time, the
court singled out collective bargaining agreements subject to the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. § 156 (1982), in the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1167. According to the court:
The sheer complexity of the Bankruptcy Reform Act might preclude our use of
§ 1167 as definitive proof that every other collective bargaining agreement may
be rejected, but the section permits an inference that, with this one exception,
Congress did not intend to distinguish collective bargaining agreements from
executory contracts in general.
682 F.2d at 78.
20. See In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 79 ("The impact of rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement on the rights of workers and the favored status those rights have
been accorded by Congress, however, require a more stringent examination of the evi-
dence offered to justify rejection of such a contract.").
21. Id. at 79-80. In describing the "balance of equities" test, the court adopted the
language of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Shopmen's
Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1975).
22. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). In discussing the plight of the successor employer, the
United States Supreme Court noted:
A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he
can make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work
location, task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an employer
with the terms and conditions of employment contained in the old collective-
bargaining contract may make these changes impossible and may discourage and
inhibit the transfer of capital.
Id. at 287-88.
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vin Steel Products, Inc. ,23 both of which held that a debtor in
possession was similar to a successor employer, 4 or a "new
entity" which could not be bound by its predecessor's collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Therefore it was not subject to
the determination restrictions of section 8(d) of the National
Labor Relations Act as alleged by the union.25
Finally, the Third Circuit held that Bildisco's failure to
comply with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
did not constitute an unfair labor practice.2 6 The case was
then remanded to the bankruptcy court for further considera-
tion in light of the standards for rejection which it had estab-
lished. The opinion of the Third Circuit held that if on
remand the bankruptcy court permitted rejection of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, the NLRB would be bound by
such a determination. 7 The United States Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari for the Bildisco case on January 17,
1983.
III. THE BILDIsCo DECISION
In an opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision reached by the Third Circuit.28
23. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). Kevin Steel Products, Inc., a New York steel
fabricator and erector, and a debtor in possession under Chapter 11, was granted per-
mission to reject its collective bargaining agreement with Shopmen's Local Union No.
455. This decision was reversed by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, which was, in turn, reversed by the Second Circuit. See
Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 336, 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
24. For a general discussion of successorship law, see Morris & Gaus, Successorship
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L.
REV. 1359 (1973). See also NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281-91
(1972) (while a "successor employer" had a duty to bargain pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5), it was not required to observe the substantive terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement negotiated between the union and its corporate predecessors).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). See supra note 3.
26. This conclusion was based, in part, upon the premise, albeit a legal fiction, that
the debtor in possession acquired the status of a "new entity" at the time it petitioned in
bankruptcy. Thus, no agreements between the debtor in possession and other parties
were in effect subsequent to the date the Chapter 11 petition was filed. For further
discussion of the "new entity" theory, see Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v.
Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976), affd per curiam after remand, 567 F.2d 237
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
27. See In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 84.
28. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
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Noting that the language of section 365(a)29 provides for the
rejection of all executory contracts unless expressly exempted
thereby,30 the Court accepted the argument promulgated by
Bildisco 3I and advanced by the Third Circuit.32 Section 1167
of the Bankruptcy Code restricts a debtor in possession's
power to reject a collective bargaining agreement.3 Hence,
the Court found that Congress' failure to expressly restrict
this power of the debtor in possession gave rise to an inference
that Congress had intended that such agreements should not
be awarded deferential judicial treatment. 4
The Court also affirmed the standard adopted by the Third
Circuit for the rejection of Bildisco's collective bargaining
agreement. It stated that "[t]he Bankruptcy Court should
permit rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under
section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code if the debtor can show
that the collective bargaining agreement burdens the estate,
and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of
rejecting the labor contract." 35 However, the Court further
added that before rejecting the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the bankruptcy court must be persuaded that the debtor
in possession had made reasonable efforts to negotiate a "vol-
untary modification" and that such efforts were unlikely to
produce a "prompt and satisfactory solution. '36
29. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
30. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194.
31. See Brief for Respondents, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188
(1984).
32. See In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1982), affd sub nom. NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982).
34. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194. For a discussion of the judicial interpretation
of congressional intent, see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
35. 104 S. Ct. at 1196. In elaborating upon the factors to be considered by the
"balance of equities" test, the Court stated:
The Bankruptcy Court must consider the likelihood and consequences of liqui-
dation for the debtor absent rejection, the reduced value of the creditors' claims
that would follow from affirmance and the hardship that would impose on them,
and the impact of rejection on the employees. In striking the balance, the Bank-
ruptcy Court must consider not only the degree of hardship faced by each party,
but also any qualitative differences between the types of hardship each may face.
Id. at 1197.
36. Id. at 1196.
1985]
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A. Rejecting the "New Entity" Theory
The Supreme Court evaluated the NLRB's claim that
Bildisco committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally re-
jecting or modifying the collective bargaining agreement. It
rejected the arguments by both parties which attempted to
classify the debtor in possession as either the "alter ego" of the
debtor,37 or as a "new entity."' 38 It stated instead that the
debtor in possession was in fact "the same entity which ex-
isted before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, but empow-
ered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its
contracts and property in a manner it could not have done
absent the bankruptcy filing." '39
Finally, the Court held that a debtor in possession does
not violate subsections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the National Labor
Relations Act when it unilaterally changes the terms of its col-
lective bargaining agreement after the petition in bankruptcy
has been filed but before the bankruptcy court has authorized
the rejection because the agreement is unenforceable under
section 8(d).4° To hold otherwise, stated the Court, "would
largely, if not completely, undermine whatever benefit the
debtor-in-possession otherwise obtains by its authority to re-
quest rejection of the agreement."'" Furthermore, it main-
tained, such an enforcement of section 8(d) would run
"directly counter" to congressional intent.42
37. The Court used the term "alter ego" in reference to the petitioner's claim that
the debtor in possession did not differ in any substantive way from the debtor: "In sum,
there was no change in or replacement of the owners, managers, supervisors, employees,
or the business and operations of Bildisco .... " Brief for Petitioner Local Union No.
408, International Brotherhood of Teamsters at 24, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S.
Ct. 1188 (1984).
38. See Brief for Respondents at 27, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188
(1984).
39. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
40. See id. at 1198-1200.
41. Id. at 1198.
42. Id. at 1199. The Court stated that Congress intended, through the Bankruptcy
Code, to afford the debtor in possession a greater degree of "flexibility and breathing
space." Id. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6296-97.
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B. Misinterpreting Congressional Intent
In its decision, the Supreme Court arrived at the conclu-
sion that Congress intended "[tihe provisions of Section
365(a) 43 [to] apply to all collective bargaining agreements cov-
ered by the National Labor Relations Act." 44 To support this
conclusion, the Court advanced the argument set forth in
Bildisco's brief: the fact that Congress had not singled out
collective bargaining agreements for special treatment was
particularly significant in light of the many detailed excep-
tions to and conditions on rejection which it placed upon
other executory contracts.4 5 Furthermore, Congress had ex-
pressly singled out labor agreements under the Railway Labor
Act 46 and placed special limitations upon the right of the
debtor in possession to reject such agreements. 47 Thus, Con-
gress' failure to place similar restrictions upon collective bar-
gaining agreements subject to section 365(a) prompted the
Court to conclude that Congress had not intended such agree-
ments to be excluded.48
The folly of the Supreme Court's interpretation of legisla-
tive intent is readily apparent from the congressional response
to the Bildisco decision.49 According to Representative Peter
43. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
44. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1195 (1984).
45. See Brief for Respondents at 15-16, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct.
1188 (1984).
46. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-58 (1982).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982) provides:
Notwithstanding section 365 of this title, neither the court nor the trustee
may change the wages or working conditions of employees of the debtor estab-
lished by a collective bargaining agreement that is subject to the Railway Labor
Act (45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) except in accordance with section 6 of such Act (45
U.S.C. § 156).
48. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1195 ("Obviously, Congress knew how to draft an
exclusion for collective-bargaining agreements when it wanted to; its failure to do so in
this instance indicates that Congress intended that § 365(a) apply to all collective-bar-
gaining agreements covered by the NLRA.").
49. Remarks made by Representative Daniel Glickman (D-Kan.) were typical of
those made by many members of the House when it considered H.R. 5174 and the
resulting Conference Report: "This package also responds to what I consider to have
been a misinterpretation of congressional intent by the Supreme Court in its Bildisco
decision with regard to the status of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcies."
130 CONG. REC. H7494 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
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Rodino,5 ° Congress intended its silence on the issue of collec-
tive bargaining agreements in 197851 to be construed by the
courts as approval of the deferential treatment already ac-
corded by the strict standard clearly set forth by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Brotherhood
of Railway and Airline Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.5 2 Repre-
sentative Rodino stated that, "[tihe Congress was fully aware
of the strict standard for rejection established in REA Express
and believed it was simply continuing that standard when it
enacted the 1978 law."53 The United States House of Repre-
sentatives subsequently passed H.R. 5174, legislation which
contained language that would have expressly codified the
standard for rejection enunciated by the Second Circuit. 4
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
The congressional response to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion was quick and decisive.5 5 The Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 is the conference version
of H.R. 5174, an omnibus bankruptcy bill with four major
50. Representative Rodino (D-NJ) was the Chairperson of the House Judiciary
Committee and the primary mover of H.R. 5174, the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.
51. Representative Rodino was referring to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982).
52. 523 F.2d 164, 167-69 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that REA Express, Inc.,
could reject its collective bargaining agreement upon a showing to the district court that
the agreement (1) was onerous and burdensome, and (2) would thwart efforts to save
the failing carrier in bankruptcy from collapse.
53. 130 CONG. REC. H1723 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
54. H.R. 5174 was the House version of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98
Star.) 333. This bill provided in pertinent part: "(g) The court may not approve the
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under this title unless - (2) Absent rejec-
tion of such agreement, the jobs covered by such agreement will be lost and any finan-
cial reorganization of the debtor will fail." H.R. 5174, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
55. Within less than two hours after NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco was decided by
the Supreme Court, Representative Peter Rodino (D-NJ), Chairperson of the House
Judiciary Committee, introduced H.R. 4908, which was intended to overturn the
Supreme Court's decision. Republicans charged that the labor provisions were "rail-
roaded" through Congress because neither the full Judiciary Committee nor the appro-
priate subcommittee held hearings on H.R. 4908 or similar provisions which were
subsequently incorporated into H.R. 5174 and ultimately passed by both houses as the
"Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984." See 130 CONG. REC.
H1771 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1984) (statement of Rep. Gingrich).
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provisions: (1) to facilitate a restructuring of the bankruptcy
court system which had been established in 1978 and declared
unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline Construction Company
v. Marathon Pipe Line Company ;56 (2) to reform the consumer
bankruptcy laws to allow a court to dismiss consumer bank-
ruptcy cases filed under Chapter 757 if it determined that
granting such relief would constitute a "substantial abuse" of
the bankruptcy laws;58 (3) to aid farmers affected by grain ele-
vator bankruptcies; 59 and (4) to overturn the Supreme Court's
decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco6° by substantially lim-
iting the circumstances under which a collective bargaining
agreement may be rejected by a debtor in possession in a
bankruptcy case. 61 H.R. 5174 was signed into law by Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan on July 10, 1984.
Specifically, the BAJA would establish a set of provisions
with which the trustee or debtor in possession 62 must comply
before filing an application to reject or modify its collective
bargaining agreement. The debtor in possession must first
submit a proposal to the union outlining the modifications of
the agreement which are necessary to facilitate reorganization
and which contain assurances that all affected parties are
56. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In Marathon the United States Supreme Court held, in
part, that because the bankruptcy court judges were not afforded the protections set
forth for federal judges under article III of the Constitution of the United States -
lifetime tenure during good behavior and salaries that cannot be reduced - the bank-
ruptcy court system established by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was unconstitu-
tional. Titles I and II of the Bankruptcy Amendments and the Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984 provided for the appointment of article III bankruptcy judges consistent with
the standards enunciated by the Court in Marathon. See Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333.
57. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1982).
58. See Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 352-
58. The significant increase in the number of personal bankruptcies filed under Chapter
7 has given rise to charges that the bankruptcy system is subject to abuse from consum-
ers with steady incomes who could eventually afford to repay their debts. Chapter 7
permits a debtor to permanently eliminate debts by liquidating all current assets rather
than filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 and agreeing to spread payments to credi-
tors over a period of time.
59. Id. at 358-61.
60. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
61. See Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 390-
91 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113).
62. Id. § 541(b)(1), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 390-91 (to be codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(1)). This section provides in pertinent part: "hereinafter in this
section 'trustee' shall include a debtor in possession . ... "
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treated "fairly and equitably. ' 63 Furthermore, the debtor in
possession must meet in "good faith" with representatives and
present financial data relevant to evaluating the proposal.64
Most importantly, the bankruptcy court shall approve the ap-
plication to reject the collective bargaining agreement only af-
ter it finds that the debtor in possession has complied with the
preceding provisions, that the authorized representative of the
union has refused to accept such proposal without "good
cause, ' 65 and that "the balance of the equities clearly favors
rejection of such agreement. ' 66  Finally, Congress included
several safety provisions which would ensure that judicial ac-
tion upon an application would proceed rapidly.
V. INTERPRETING BILDIscO
Section 541(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the BAJA 67 should serve to
allay one of organized labor's greatest fears in the wake of the
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco68 decision - that an employer
could exaggerate or even fabricate the need to file for reorgan-
ization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and subse-
63. Section 541(b)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part:
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession. . . shall
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered
by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information avail-
able at the time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary modifica-
tions in the employees' benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of
the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably ....
64. Section 541(b)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part:
[The debtor in possession shall -] (B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the
representative of the employees with such relevant information as is necessary to
evaluate the proposal. (2) . .. [T]he trustee shall meet, at reasonable times,
with the authorized representative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach
mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreements.
65. Id. § 541(c)(2).
66. Id. § 541(c)(3). The language combined in the original H.R. 5174 provided for
a much higher standard for rejection than that ultimately adopted by the Conference
Committee. "The court may not approve the rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment under this title unless - . . . (2) absent rejection of such agreement, the jobs
covered by such agreement will be lost and any financial reorganization of the debtor
will fail." H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H1842 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
1984).
67. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333,
390-91 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113).
68. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
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quently abrogate its collective bargaining agreements. With
the passage of the BAJA, the legitimacy of this concern may
never be determined. Subsection b(l)(B) requires that a
trustee seeking rejection provide the union's representative
with "such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the
proposal .... ,,69 Furthermore, the debtor in possession
must "meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized repre-
sentative to confer in good faith .... ,70 Together, these
provisions lend assurance to a union that an employer will not
be able to unilaterally abrogate its collective bargaining agree-
ments in "bad faith." 71
Another major difference between the Supreme Court's
decision in Bildisco and the BAJA is their conceptual treat-
ment of the time interval between the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11 and the bankruptcy
court's authorization to reject the contract. The Court held
that during this time interval, "the collective bargaining
agreement is not an enforceable contract within the meaning
of NLRA Section 8(d)." 72 The approval of an application for
rejection relates back to the date upon which the petition was
filed pursuant to Chapter 11. 73  Thus, according to the
Bildisco Court, the NLRB was precluded from finding that
the debtor in possession had committed unfair labor practices
by unilaterally modifying the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement,74 conferrring obvious benefits upon the debtor
in possession.
The BAJA strips the debtor in possession of benefits con-
ferred by the Bildisco decision. By prohibiting the unilateral
69. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541(b)(1)(B).
70. Id. § 541(b)(2)(B).
71. The Bildisco Court preserved bargaining requirements:
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the debtor-in-possession is not relieved
of all obligations under the NLRA simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy. A
debtor-in-possession is an "employer" within the terms of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(1) and (2), and is obligated to bargain collectively with the employees'
certified representative over the terms of a new contract pending rejection of the
existing contract following formal approval of rejection by the Bankruptcy
Court.
Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1201.
72. Id. at 1199.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(i) (1982).
74. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1199.
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modification of the collective bargaining agreement prior to
compliance with the notice, meeting, and court rejection pro-
visions contained in subsection (b)(1), the BAJA provides that
the collective bargaining agreement is not automatically unen-
forceable upon the filing of petitions.15 Furthermore, since the
BAJA prohibits unilateral modifications prior to rejection,
such modifications would preclude the court from authorizing
the application for rejection, and thus the "relation back" doc-
trine could not be triggered and its benefits realized. 6
Specific language in the BAJA promises to become a
source of considerable debate as bankruptcy courts across the
nation interpret this legislation. One of the essential require-
ments for approving an application for the rejection of a col-
lective bargaining agreement is that the bankruptcy court
must find that the union representative refused to accept the
required proposal without "good cause."'7 7 Clearly, Congress
has charged the courts with the substantial responsibility of
defining the scope of the "good cause" provision. Representa-
tive Dan Lungren, a member of the conference committee on
H.R. 5174, acknowledged before the House that while the
phrase "good cause" was undefined, "[t]he conferees clearly
believed that it should be interpreted narrowly by a reviewing
court; it certainly was not intended to permit virtually any
refusal on the part of the labor representative. T7  On the
other hand, determining whether a union's representative had
"good cause" to refuse a proposal made by the debtor in pos-
session would necessitate, in effect, a judicial "balancing of the
equities" at a much earlier stage in the litigation process than
Congress had intended.
VI. CONCLUSION
The BAJA 79 is a welcome and overdue attempt by Con-
gress to reconcile the conflict created by the often competing
75. See Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541(b)(1).
76. See id. § 541(f).
77. See id. § 541(c)(2).
78. 130 CONG. REC. H7495 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Lungren
(R-Cal.)).
79. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, § 541, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 333, 390-91 (to be codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 1113).
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interests of labor and management and advanced through the
language of the Bankruptcy Code80 and the National Labor
Relations Act.81 It is curious to note that while the BAJA
was initiated in response to NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,82 the
two are not entirely incompatible.
Procedurally, the BAJA establishes a much stricter stan-
dard for the rejection of collective bargaining agreements than
the standard posited by the Court in Bildisco. However, in the
final analysis, the BAJA calls upon the court to "balance the
equities" - presumably utilizing many of the same factors
identified by the Court in Bildisco. It seems clear that Con-
gress adopted this facet of the Bildisco standard in recognition
of the fact that despite the statutory protections it affords
either the debtor in possession or the union, a bankruptcy
court is still in the best position to evaluate the equities unique
to each case.
ROBERT J. FLEMMA, JR.
80. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982).
81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
82. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
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